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I. INTRODUCTION
Java's write-once-run-everywhere capability, along with its easy
accessibility, have propelled the software and Internet communities
to embrace it as the de facto standard for writing applications for
complex networks.1
Companies fight tooth and nail for their development tool
software technology to become a standard in the software industry.
With a "standard" designation comes the developer community's
support vital for a company's success, 2 creation of third party
products employing the inventor's technologies, and brand
recognition far beyond the initial creation of the standard.
Although it seems to be firm law that a holder of software
intellectual property is not required to license its technology to any
third party,3 particular questions about this general rule arise when a
1. Sun Microsystems Press Release (visited Jan. 31, 1998)
<http:lwww.sun.comlsmilPress/sunflash/9601/sunflash.960123.10561.html>.
2. The industry uses the number of software developers using a particular technology as
a hallmark of a software technology's success. This measurement was indicative of Apple's
downturn in recent years. Developers began to develop fewer Apple programs because of the
company's problems, and consumers began to purchase fewer Apple products because there
weren't enough applications to run on them; the problem is a vicious circle. The number of
developers attending Apple's annual conference had been declining radically, a problem for
Apple that is beginning to reverse itself with the company's recent rebound. See, e.g., Connie
Guglieimo, Mac Developers Get Their First Serious Look at New OS, INTERACTIVE WEEK
ONLINE, May 14, 1997, (visited Jan. 20, 1998) <http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/
content/inwo/0514/inwoOO06.html>.
3. See infra Part III.A., for discussion on licensing in patent law.
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software development tool becomes a standard. The creator or
assignee of standardized technology at first glance seems entitled to
complete ownership rights under intellectual property laws.
However, if the owner of the technology refuses to license its
technology to a third party, that party might not be able to compete in
the marketplace if compliance with the standard is essential to a
product's success. An unauthorized user of the technology could
raise affirmative defenses against the owner of the technology in an
infringement suit under copyright or patent laws. Alternatively, the
technology owner could be held liable under any one of several
antitrust theories.4  As a result, developers of standardized
development tool and language technology effectively may be
donating their inventions to the public, lest they face liability under a
number of legal theories.5
Because of the need for interchangeability of computer
programs, standardization is essential in the software industry and is
desperately needed. But creators of such standards may pay a heavy
price: they may not be able to effectively enforce rights against others
to protect what they own. Congress must reconcile conflict between
antitrust and intellectual property laws for protection of development
tool technology.
This comment will provide an overview of software technology
and the function of software development tools. A cursory
explanation of intellectual property laws applicable to software
technology will be discussed. Next, this comment will outline the
antitrust laws potentially applicable to disputes involving software
development tools. Finally, defenses to patent and copyright
infringement actions will be introduced; several of which are closely
related to the antitrust laws. Throughout the discussion, this author
will seek to explain the conflicts between the intellectual property
laws that protect software, antitrust law, and defenses available to an
otherwise infringing defendant. The conclusion of this comment will
propose a solution to some of these unreconciled conflicts.
4. For example, an owner of software technology could be liable under the essential
facility doctrine. It is illegal for the controller of a properly defined essential facility to deny
access to a competitor. An essential facility exists where access to a "facility" is essential for
firms to compete. It is perhaps best described by example: courts have held a local electricity
monopoly, a stadium, and a railroad to be essential facilities. See e.g. Otter Tall Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378 (1973). In Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536,
544-46 (9th Cir. 1991), a computer reservation system was not an essential facility, where denial
of access to it merely had the effect of imposing higher costs on United's rival. Alaska Airlines
could still have competed without it.
5. See infra Parts IV and V.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY
A. Development Tools in Software
Software is built by writing lines of humanly-comprehendible
source code,6 in a particular programming language, 7 which are then
compiled8 into binary form 9 that a computer can understand. This
resulting code is known as object code.' 0 Object code is then linkedlI
further by a compiler into code which the computer can execute,
known as executable code.12
People can write source code in any number of different
computer programming languages, depending on the purpose of the
resulting application and the the timeframe for development. 13 Many
6. Source code is defined as "[S]ymbolic coding in its original form before being
processed by a computer...." WEBSTER'S NEwWORLD DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER TERMS
(1988). Modernly, source code is often compiled, but sometimes is automatically translated into
computer instructions when a programmer programs in one of the scripting languages, such as
Perl, JavaScript, or VBScript. These scripting languages stay in human perceivable form, i.e.,
source code, and then get automatically translated line by line by a special interpreter which
carries out the commands of the scripts at the time the program is run. In contrast, languages
such as C, C++, Java, and Pascal run only with compiled code. For a program to be compiled, a
programmer must gather together all the necessary files and specifically instruct the compiling
program, (e.g., Microsoft's C++, Borland's Turbo C, or Symantec's Caf6 (for Java)) to compile
and link the source code into something the computer can understand. See infra notes 7-10 and
accompanying text.
7. A programming language can be defined as a "set of rules that specify which
sequences of symbols constitute a program, and what compilation the program describes." M.
BEN-ARI, UNDERSTANDING PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES 3 (1996).
8. A compiler program "translates the symbols into an object module, which contains
machine code instructions for a specific computer." Id.
9. Binary refers to the fact that the instructions the computer reads are in a series of Os
and Is. Each 0 or I is referred to as a bit. If a file is in binary, it is in machine readable form.
Different operating systems are often completely binary incompatible (i.e., a series of Os and Is
may mean something completely different to a Macintosh than to a Windows machine), which is
why there are so many different versions of programs for every different operating system. A
byte, in contrast to a bit, is defined as a grouping of adjacent binary digits operated on the
computer as a unit. See WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 214 (1984).
10. Object code is output from a compiler or assembler that is itself executable machine
code or is suitable for further processing to produce executable machine code. See WEBSTER'S
NEWWORLD DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER TERMS (1988).
11. A linking program collects object files and determines the relation of the various
objects to each other so that the combination of them forms an executable file. See M. BEN-ARi,
supra note 7, at 35.
12. On Windows machines, this is often designated as an ".exe" file. An executable file
can run all by itself, without aid from other programs. However, an executable file often is not
self contained; it may need information from other run-time library files, such as .dll (dynamic
link libraries) files, which, as their name implies, are accessed at the time they are needed.
13. For example, Visual Basic is a very easy environment in which to develop
applications, but its programs require help from an interpreter and do not offer as robust
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programming languages in modem use are owned by the companies
that invented them.14 These companies often freely give licenses to
distribute the end result of applications built with their languages. 15
Developers often significantly shorten the development process
by purchasing source code or object code tools from third party
developers in the form of libraries 16 or other development modules. 17
Commonly used third party tools are graphic libraries 18 and
networking APIs. 19  Along with other technologies, these tools
incorporate every conceivable software application. These shortcuts
for developers can be purchased in many ways: included in compilers,
shrink wrapped in retail products, downloaded free off the Internet,20
and licensed in deals for a purchase price of $5.00 to many millions.
development capabilities as a language like C or C++. As such, if a company wanted to build an
application very quickly for in-house use, it might use Visual Basic. But if the application
needed to perform complex multi-threaded tasks, or if it wanted to distribute it beyond the
company or sell it, C, Java, or C++ might be used.
14. With languages, this is usually patent ownership. The languages Java and Visual
Basic are owned by Sun Microsystems and Microsoft, respectively. See infra Part III.B.
15. See, e.g., Sun Microsystem's Java licensing policies:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT LICENSING JAVA
How do I know if I need a commercial source code license?
Commercial source licensing is required if you want to take our OEM
source code and merge it into a commercial product. For example,
browser companies that add the Java interpreter and class libraries to their
browsers.
You do not need a source code license to write and distribute applets or
applications in the Java language. Sun's binary license on our web page
permits developers to write software in the Java language, as well as
distribution of the binaries for the Java interpreter along with applications,
at no cost.
Sun Microsystems Web Site, Press Releases, (visited Feb. 15, 1998)
<http://java.sun.com/navfbusiness/license-faq.htmbl>.
16. A library can be defined as a set of algorithms for problems that arise in many
contexts. Thus, rather than programmers continually inventing or re-writing code to do the
same basic things, such as concatenating words, or finding the cosine of a triangle, they can rely
on libraries to do these things for them. These routines may be supplied with the computer
system, bought by third party developers, or designed in-house. See P. ME'T, INTRODUCTION
To COMPUTING 16 (1990).
17. For example, a class. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
18. See id.; see also infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text for a description of a
specific set of libraries.
19. An API, or applications programming interface, is a set of libraries accessible to a
programmer so that he or she may use them to accomplish functions that the main program was
intended to do. For example, Microsoft has a set of APIs available fox its Office 97 suite so that
programmers may program custom features into its products. See e.g., NetManage's TCP/IP
software development kit (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http://www.netmanage.conproducts>.
20. See, for example, Netscape Corporation, DevEdge Online (last visited Feb. 19, 1999)
<http://developer.netscape.com/> (Netscape's software developer site) where one can download
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B. Languages and Libraries
Certain languages and tools are in the public domain and thus,
are not owned by anyone. For example, the language BASIC was
invented at Dartmouth College in the 1960s as an instructional
programming language;21 C was invented by Brian Kernigan and
Dennis Ritchie at Bell Labs;22 HTML, by Tim Berners-Lee at CERN;
and C++, by Bjarne Stoustrup.23  These contributors felt their
language inventions should be part of the public domain, and they
retain no ownership rights.24 Each language has its own set of
accepted standard. As a result, many public domain libraries and
tools available for development exist in these languages,25 and many
vendors have incorporated these public domain languages into their
products. 26
In addition to public domain languages, companies also promote
their own languages for widespread use. Perhaps the newest and the
most notable is Java, an object-oriented programming language
developed by Sun Microsystems.2 7 It is modeled after C++, but is
designed to be small, simple, and portable across platforms and
operating systems, both at the source and at the binary levels. 28 Java
is available to any party as a language with which to write
various SDKs (software development kits) at no charge.
21. See MET, supra note 16, at44.
22. See BRIAN KERNIGHAN AND DENNIS RITCHIE, THE C PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE (2d
ed. 1988). The C language was invented in 1970, superceding a language they were formerly
using called "B". See id. at 1.
23. See STEVE OUALLINE, PRACTICAL C++ PROGRAMMING 4 (1995). C++ gets its title
from the arithmetic instruction in C to increment a variable by one by using the "++" operator.
Therefore, C++ is one generation away from C.
24. The standards for the definition of these languages are often governed by various
standard setting bodies, such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), which set an
ANSI standard for C in 1988. See KERNIGHAN AND RITCHIE, supra note 22, at 2. The Internet
Engineering Task Force, publishes RFCs (Requests for Comments) on what should make up the
official version of the language. However, vendors rarely, if ever, comply with the official,
approved industry version. For example, various browser companies have greatly expanded
HTML (Hypertext Markup Language) by adding additional "tags" (the formatting specifiers in
HTML) to the language. The standards bodies often incorporate the new tags into the next
version of standards. Because technology cycles are so fast and standards bodies take so long,
the actual standard for a rapidly evolving language is never clearly set.
25. See, e.g., The GNU Project Homepage, (last visited June 11, 1998)
<http://www.gnu.org>. GNU is an organization and community that maintains public domain
code.
26. See, e.g., Microsoft's Visual C++ product, Visual C++ Start Page, (visited June 11,
1998) <http://www.msdn.microsoft.com/developer>.
27. See generally, JavaSoft Web Site, (visited May 20,1998) <http://java.sun.com>.
28. See supra notes 6 and 9 and accompanying text; See also LAURA LEMAY & CHARLES
PERKINS, TEACH YOURSELFJAVA IN 21 DAYS (1996).
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applications, but it is not available for redistribution.29
Scripting languages such as JavaScript30 and VB Script3' have
also become widespread. Scripting langugages are simpler versions
of languages, which are interpreted only at the time they are used, and
are never compiled - they forever remain in source code form. If a
software development company wants to provide scripting capability
in an application, such as in a web browser, it would have to obtain a
license to do so from the respective owner.32 However, anyone is free
to write HTML pages on their site and incorporate these scripting
languages in them. It is probable, if not certain, that a Web browser33
not able to interpret these scripting languages is doomed to
marketplace failure.34
C. The Implementation of Development Tool Technologies
1. Language Dependent Development Tools
Libraries, 35 APIs,36 or other modules used for computer
programming can generally be categorized into two groups of tools.
One group enables a programmer to write in a particular language.
These tools would allow a programmer to copy or store data, or
allocate memory on a machine necessary to run programs. For
29. See Frequently Asked Questions About Java and JDK, (last modified Jan. 1997)
<http://java.sun.com/products/jdk/faq/hml>. The FAQ currently states:
D1. Is Java free? Where can I get information on licensing?
The Java Development Kit (JDK) is free to download and use for
commercial programming, but not to re-distribute...
D2. Can I use the Java logo?
Sun does not authorize the use of the Java logo...
Id.
30. Owned by Netscape Communications. The Java portion of the language was licensed
from Sun Microsystems.
31. Owned by Microsoft Corporation.
32. See Steve Reichenthal & Tom Bennett, SBI: The Small Basic Interpreter, DR. DOBBS'
JOURNAL, June 1997, at 54.
33. A web browser is an application that allows one to see the graphical representation of
HTML, which formats text when read by an HTML interpreter. A browser acts as an HTML
interpreter.
34. This is because the use of these scripting languages is so wide spread by Web sites. A
browser downloads pages of a server onto the local hard drive of the visitor's computer. The
browser then interprets code embedded in the page. If a Web page incorporates JavaScript, the
local browser must know how to interpret the code. If it does not, the visitor will not experience
the full functionality of the Web site.
35. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Microsoft Excel's product documentation, discussing the APIs available to
customize Excel. See also supra note 19.
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example, to write code in the language Java, you must have the Java
class 37 libraries. These libraries are essential to operate in a specified
language; without them, there is no executable program. In other
words, when a company licenses a language, it licenses the libraries
that are essential to run the programs written in it. Therefore, all
developers are utterly dependent on some outside libraries, even in
writing the most basic of programs. This is common to all languages,
regardless of type.38
2. Stand-Alone Libraries, Modules and APIs 39
The other group of tools consists of libraries that "stand alone"
and are language independent. 40  Some of these tools enable a
programmer to cut time or develop something that is beyond his or
her particular expertise. Other libraries are vital to a company's
survival in a specific industry. Still others provide functionality for a
particular type of application. For example, a graphics application
can be written in any language, but it must utilize certain graphic
libraries or the industry will never embrace the end product. 41
In addition, publishers of many software applications and
operating systems provide functional access to their products through
APIs,42 eliminating the need for source code or language licensing.
These APIs can be either language-independent or dependent. Many
of Microsoft's products, including the Office and BackOffice families
and Windows95, as well as Apple's Macintosh operating system43
37. A class is an object-oriented term referring to a "useful grouping that is based on the
behavior and state that [class members] have in common." MICHAEL GUTTMAN & JASON R.
MATrHEws, THE OBJECr TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 171 (1995). A class contains data and the
methods for operating on that data. One accesses a class in a manner similar to the way one
accesses a library in a programming language.
38. Some libraries essential in the programming language C are stdio.h (input output
functions), time.h (calculating time), string.h (manipulation on strings), and malloc.h (memory
allocation).
39. These terms are roughly interchangeable. They are often called different names based
on how they are implemented, but they all achieve much of the same means, which is to allow
programmability through code a third party developer has created. See supra notes 16 and 19.
40. Some libraries can be accessed by multiple languages regardless of the language in
which the libraries were originally written.
41. For example, a game developer might use the Microsoft Direct X libraries. The
developer could use other graphic libraries, selected according to how the game operates, but his
or her selection must be within a certain subset of graphics libraries because the operating
system and hardware companies have only tested their software for optimization with the most
popular libraries.
42. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Apple - Design and Publishing, (visited June 11, 1998)
<http:lwww.apple.comlpublishingl>.
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follow this model. The publishers of these products not only
distribute the APIs along with their products,44 but they also publish
development kits and books, hold huge developer conferences, and
demonstrate at trade shows to make adoption of their technologies
quite easy. Obtaining the support of these applications developers is
critical to the success of a personal computer operating system
product.45
D. The Standardization Problem46
The creators of these development technologies want developers
to adopt and use their language libraries and software code libraries as
standards in the industry. To achieve this end, they endlessly tout
their products' benefits,47 offer their products for download, and
provide technical support. They often do all of this for free, without
even asking for the downloader's name.48
The developer market jumps at the best of these technologies,
but for much of software to work, it needs standardization. This need
for standardization in software explains Microsoft's ability to secure a
vast majority of the operating systems in existence on the market.49
Network protocols and operating systems require some high level of
deployment and connectivity in order for developers to create
44. See id.
45. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. There are many tools, libraries, and other
languages the industry does not consider to be standards or to be necessary for software product
development. See, e.g. Rogue Wave Tools advertisement, DR. DOBBS JOURNAL, Apr. 1997, at
8-9. Vendors, such as Rogue Wave, provide various utility and other libraries for C++ and Java
programmers. Although purchasing products from a company such as Rogue Wave may save a
company a great deal of time and resources than it would otherwise have to expend to build the
same utilities, any company with enough time and money could build them. That is, they are
not so standardized, like Java, that a company would fail if it couldn't incorporate Rogue
Wave's products in its own products.
46. For a comprehensive discussion of these problems as particularly applied to the
Internet, see Mark. A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L.
REV. 1041 (1996).
47. From the author's professional experience, most software companies spend over 50%
of their budgets on marketing.
48. This happens frequently with software programs as well. The current browser wars
between Netscape and Microsoft recently escalated when Netscape followed Microsoft's lead
and decided to offer their browser for free, and also included the source code! Not even
Microsoft is so bold. See Netscape Press Release, Netscape Announces Plans to Make Next-
Generation Communicator Source Code Available Free On The Internet (visited Jan. 31, 1998)
< http:lwww.netscape.comlnewsreflpr/newsrelease558.html>.
49. It is estimated that Microsoft's operating systems are installed on as many as 95% of
all computers. See Will Rodger, Microsoft Hands Over Documents, INTER@CrVE WEEK (Jan.
29, 1999) available at
<http://www.zdnet.com/peweektstorieslnews/0,4153,1013773,00.html>.
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applications and transmit data over networks. 50 A developer can
write a program once for Microsoft's operating systems that will work
for almost all existing users. 51 An end user can buy one operating
system from Microsoft and then easily add additional programs she
knows will be compatible.
Herein lies the crux of the issue. If everyone could freely utilize
the dominant market standard, then ownership of a standard is moot.
Competitors would simply copy the standard and sell products based
on that standard. Such is the case with TCP/IP, the standard
communications protocol for the Internet.52 It belongs to no one -
that is, it is in the public domain.
But the developer of the standard must get something for his
creative efforts in developing a standard. The same factors that drive
the software industry towards standards may also drive the industry
towards monopoly of the industry.53 This is to say, there is probably
going to be a natural monopolist because usually a standard is an
invention of a particular company. To solve this very problem in the
past, industry competitors once cross-licensed their patent
portfolios. 54 These pacts became an efficient way to avoid extensive
licensing negotiations for technologies that were standards in an
industry.55 This is not a common practice today however, so new
solutions must be developed.
Once companies develop software for commercial consumption,
it is licensed, not sold.56 Customers almost universally encounter the
End User License Agreement ("EULA") when purchasing software.57
Software licenses often cover all forms of intellectual property.58
Development tool agreements are often more complicated than other
standard software agreements 59 and usually grant the user rights to
50. For example, the software on the Internet speaks on one protocol, TCP/IP. See
DOUGLAS E. COMER, THE INTERNET BOOK 86 (1995).
51. Seeid.
52. See iL
53. See Lemley, supra note 46, at 1047-50.
54. See CHARLES H. FERGUSON & CHARLES R. MORRIS, COMPUTER WARS: How THE
WEST CAN WIN IN A POST-IBM WORLD 154-57 (1993).
55. See id.
56. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass
Market Softvare License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 335, 338-41 (1996).
57. See id. for a comprehensive discussion of EULAs.
58. See infra Part III, for a discussion of software intellectual property rights.
59. See Darren J. Carroll, When More is Less: Controlling the Market for Computer
Software Enhancements, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1321, 1345 (1992); Gomulkiewicz &
Williamson, supra note 56, at 354.
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copy and distribute derivative works developed from sample source
code and certain binary files. 60 A software license may include a
license to the copyrights, patents, and trademarks contained within the
software.61 These intellectual property laws are triggered when an
infringement suit is brought.
III. CURRENT INFELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR SoFTWvaRE -
THE RIGHT TO KEEP WHAT You OwN
A. Patent Protection for Software
Patents are an exclusively federal form of intellectual property
protection. 62  Even though a patent is at its very core a
monopolization of an invention, patents are allowed to exist for a
greater good. The framers of the Constitution believed that society
has a larger interest in allowing these monopolies to exist because of
the resulting improvements to society as a whole. Without patent
protection, inventors might be afraid to create or to expose their
inventions because others would use their inventions without
compensating the creator. The constitutional protection provides an
incentive for inventors to share their works with the world.
At one time, software was not patentable. Although this is no
longer the case, 63 the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") formerly viewed software as comprised of mathematical
equations and algorithms, 64 and equated it to mere exploitation of
facts in existence rather than discoveries of new processes. 65 After a
60. See, e.g., EULA for Microsoft Visual Studio; Gomulkiewicz, supra note 56, at 354.
61. See infra Part III, on the development of intellectual property rights in software.
62. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, el. 8 states: "The Congress shall have Power... to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ......
63. In the well-known case of Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that software does not constitute an inherently unpatentable subject matter. The
Supreme Court held that so long as the mathematical algorithm inherent in the software is part
of a larger process or apparatus that is patentable, the entire process may be granted patent
protection, despite the presence of software. But the first widely recognized pure software
patent came with In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982), awarded after twelve years of
patent prosecution.
64. Software actually is comprised of mathematics on a low level. Computer
programming consists mainly of operations on data; moving a series of Os and is around to
create events. This is done on either a high or low level; if a programmer uses a language such
as Assembly, he or she is acutely aware of the mathematical operations on the data. But a high
level language such as Java rarely if ever operates on the core building blocks (that is, Os and ls)
of a program.
65. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
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seminal Supreme Court case, Diamond v. Diehr,66 the PTO began to
accept patent applications for software. It is clear that software is
now protectible under the patent laws.67
B. The Scope of Copyright Protection for Software
Copyright protection is likewise based upon authority of the
Constitution.68 Pursuant to this authority, Congress passed the 1976
Copyright Act, which provides that all "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression" 69 are protected against
unauthorized copying. The primary purpose of the Copyright Act is
to encourage authors to create and make available their works to the
public. Like patents, the grant of a copyright yields the side effect of
a constitutionally granted monopoly in these fixed works.70
In 1980, the Copyright Act was amended to explicitly include
software.71 In the case which gave birth to this field of jurisprudence,
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp,72 the court ruled
that a computer program is a form of literary work under 17 U.S.C. §
102 and thus receives protection from unauthorized copying. It is
now commonly accepted that copyright protection extends to
software.73
But copyright law does not protect an idea - only its
expression. 74  Anyone who independently develops the same
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor...." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
66. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
67. See, e.g., In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding patent may be
issued that is based on inter-operability algorithm); Arrythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix
Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding claims where algorithm is based on
process may be granted); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1541-1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding anti-
aliasing technique algorithm is not included in mathematical algorithm bar to patent grant); In re
Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding data structure algorithm for computer
storage memory is patentable); In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding
computer programs in a tangible medium are patentable).
68. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
70. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,219 (1954).
71. Software is protected as a literary work, and is defined in the Copyright Act. "A
computer program is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
72. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
73. The Copyright Act was amended in 1980 to recognize the copyrightability in
computer programs. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1994). See also Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer, Inc., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983) (upholding validity of software
copyright).
74. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
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expression in a copyrighted work may freely use it: the copyright
prevents only illicit copying of the tangible expression.75 Literal
copying of software obviously infringes a copyright, and courts have
had no issue with finding liability in such cases.76 But cases
involving non-literal copying77 are not so clear and courts have
struggled: several evolutionary processes have emerged in modem
software copyright jurisprudence.78
C. The Use of Trademark Licenses as a Pretext for Technology
Licenses
Some companies use an additional weapon beyond patent or
copyright protection to protect their software: they use trademark
licenses.79 Trademark law gives protection to the commercial marks
of a company. It was originally created by Congress to protect
consumers from confusion. However, with the creation of the recent
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995,80 trademark law also seeks
to protect companies' interests as well.
For example, Microsoft does not require any special license to
use the libraries found in its Windows 95 software, but in order for a
software reseller to advertise that the program works with Windows
95 and to display the Microsoft logo and trademarks on its products, it
75. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217-18.
76. Literal copying means physical copying of the software code. One of the earliest
cases was Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
77. Non-literal copying means copying the aspects of the computer program that are not
reduced to written code. See Computer Assocs. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992).
78. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer, Inc., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir.
1983) (upholding validity of software copyright); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab.,
Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1237-1238 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding copyright protection for software
extends beyond literal code); Computer Assocs. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 706-11(2d Cir. 1992)
(adopting the modem abstraction-filtration comparison doctrine.) The modernly accepted
abstraction-filtration-comparison doctrine makes the following steps in determining whether a
work is infringing: (1) abstraction, where a court "dissect[s] the allegedly copied program's
structure and isolate each level of abstraction contained within it; (2) filtration, where separation
of protectable expression from non-protectable material is accomplished; and (3) comparison,
which occurs after a court has sifted out all elements of the allegedly infringed program which
are "ideas," are dictated by efficiency or external factors, taken from the public domain, etc. Id.
at 706-10. The idea-expression distinction is critical in the area of computer software; there is
often merger in the expression of software programs, and until recently, patents for software
technology have been difficult to obtain.
79. See, e.g., Silicon Graphic's Web Site, (visited June 11, 1998) <http://www.sgi.com>;
JavaSoft's Web Site (a division of Sun Microsystems) (visited June 13, 1998) at
<http://java.sun.com> (companies explain licensing policies of their trademarks).
80. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat.985 (codified
at 15 U.S.C.A.§ 1125, 1127 (1998)).
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must obtain permission to do so.81 Without the Microsoft Windows
95 trademark, the software publisher can not claim that its product
works with the Windows 95 operating system. Even though the
trademark provides no protection for Microsoft's software, sales of a
third party's compatible product are commercially infeasible without
use of the Windows 95 compatibility logo. Sun Microsystems
achieves the same end by restricting any use of its Java logo.82
IV. ANTITRUST THREAT TO SorWAR STANDARDIZATION
A. Modem Jurisprudence and its Relationship to Standardized
Development Tools
Perhaps the most worrisome problem for a creator of
standardized software technology in protecting its standardized
intellectual property is compliance with the antitrust laws. It is
assumed that the creator will have some measure of intellectual
property rights, but the enforcement of such rights can bring liability
under another family of law, antitrust. Antitrust laws prevent various
types of conduct, which include agreeing on the price competitors
will charge,83 predatory practices designed to exclude competitors
from the market,84 and certain limits on the behavior of firms with
market power.85 Refusal to license an industry standard to a party
may harm competition, thus bringing antitrust law into play.
1. Section 2 Liability for Monopoly Conduct
Congress passed Section 2 of the 1890 Sherman Act86
[hereinafter Section 2] in response to the public's outrage at giant
"trusts." It condemns "every person who shall monopolize." 87
Congress chiefly intended the Sherman Act to protect consumers
from monopolists and cartels.88 Monopolization may be proven a
81. See (visited Apr. 1, 1999) <http:llwww.microsoft.com/permission/t-mark/logos.htm>.
82. See supra note 29, and accompanying text.
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 1(1994).
84. See Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993)
(holding no predatory price discrimination under Robinson-Patman Act by defendant cigarette
manufacturer).
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
86. See id. at §§ 1-2.
87. Id.
88. The Supreme Court in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 604-05 (1966)
set forth the modem formulation of the monopoly offense, which contains two elements. The
court enumerated them as: "1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market; and 2)
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variety of ways, including proving another antitrust law has been
violated in an effort to monopolize. 89
Further, Section 2 is judicially defined as prohibiting acquisition
or the maintenance of a monopoly through anticompetitive conduct.90
Mere appearance of monopoly by market power or market share is
not enough.91
Specifically, Section 2 makes it illegal for the monopolist of a
properly defined essential facility to deny access to a competitor.92
Under the essential facility doctrine, the owners of facilities that are
essential for a company to compete must make them available to
anyone, even competitors, on non-discriminatory terms.93 A local
electricity monopoly must share its power with others, 94 and a
telephone monopoly must interconnect all long distance carriers.95
But the essential facilities doctrine is not without criticism, 96 and the
cases in which a court finds liability are few and far between. 97
An essential facility can be a natural monopoly, a subsidized
facility such as an athletic stadium, or sometimes, a regulated
monopoly.98 The monopolist of a properly defined essential facility
is often a natural monopolist. A natural monopoly is one that is
generally characterized by extremely high start-up costs and relatively
low marginal costs.99 The end result of competition in a market
characterized by a natural monopoly is a single victorious firm that
drives out its competitors. 100  Low marginal costs give natural
the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." Id.
at 570-71. A more recent case, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585
(1985), has reaffirmed this test.
89. See generally, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (holding
anticompetitive conduct can be defined as conduct which violates antitrust laws).
90. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,429-30 (2d Cir. 1945).
91. See Aluminum Co. ofAm., 148 F.2d at 429-30.
92. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
93., See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378 (1973).
94. See id.
95. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Telegraph, Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th
Cir. 1983).
96. See, e.g., PHILIP E. AREEDA & HEBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 771 (1996).
97. See Lemley, supra note 46, at 1084, citing Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948
F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991); Illinois ex rel. Burris v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 935 F.2d 1469,
1482 (7th Cir. 1991).
98. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). See also, Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
99. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POICY 30 (1994).
100. See id.
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monopoly firms an incentive to cut prices in order to expand their
market share over the entire range of the market because doing so
reduces their average total costs. 101 Competition in natural monopoly
markets can be somewhat wasteful. While the lure of the market may
cause several companies to enter, only one will succeed and the others
will struggle.
In the 1940s, the Supreme Court held that Section 2 of the
Sherman Act forbids the use of a monopoly power in one market to
acquire a competitive advantage in a second market.102 This is true
even if there has not been an attempt to monopolize the second
market. The liability comes from the "abuse" of economic power
already held in the first market, or "leveraging."103
The leveraging theory has been applied to claims that a
monopolist used restrictive agreements to obtain an unfair advantage
over rivals. 104 However, leveraging that creates a second monopoly
generally does not result in higher market prices or lower output.
This economic theory has led recent courts to now reject it
outright.105
2. Particular Issues With Software Standardization
Antitrust law today is based on enhancing competition and not
on protecting competitors. But in the software industry, like many
others, the need for standards is essential. 106 A party holding the
rights to a standard is indeed a monopolist - everyone holding a
license to Java got it from Sun - but having a standard is absolutely
necessary because of the unique way software works.107 Software
101. Seeid.
102. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107-08 (1948).
103. In United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), a firm used dominant position in
some movie theaters to obtain a competitive advantage in other locations. The Supreme Court
stated that a firm monopolizes illegally when it 1) has the power to exclude competition and 2)
has exercised it, or has the purpose or intent to exercise it. Id. at 107. Other cases have
recognized that a firm is forbidden to use monopoly power in one market to acquire a
competitive advantage in a second market "even if there has not been an attempt to monopolize
the second market." Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir.
1979). Liability flows from the abuse of economic power already held in the first market - not
from any threat that economic power will be created in the second market. See id.
104. See, e.g., Kerasotes Michigan Theaters, Inc. v. National Amusements, Inc. 854 F.2d
135, 138 (6th Cir. 1988) (reversing dismissal of leverage claim).
105. See Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 453 (1993) (holding absent proof of
dangerous probability of monopolizing relevant market, no liability for attempted
monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act).
106. See Lemley, supra note 46, at 1072.
107. See id.
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must be with a certain number of users, or else it becomes
commercially infeasible. End-users of software need to have
programs that work on their computers with few to no custom
alterations; this is only possible if standards are adopted and adhered
to by programmers with languages, operating systems, and
programming methods. Because of the factors that drive developers
and end users to standardization, there will always be some dominant
actors in the markets and a monopoly holder if the standard is
proprietary.l0
Application of Section 2 to a standardized software market with
a dominant standard does not have any prior precedent, with the
possible exception of the present trial in the case of U.S. Department
of Justice v. Microsoft.10 9 Microsoft's best legal argument is that its
current monopoly on the market was not caused by its monopolistic
behavior, but rather, that it gained its position through good
competitive practices and ingenuity.110
The tendency to standardize in the software industry may create
a natural monopoly with control over an essential facility."'l The
market for programming languages or libraries generally has and will
converge on standards over time.112  Standards in the software
development market tend to live for long periods, due to developer's
learning patterns, market inertia, and backwards compatibility needs
for prior products.113  And once a particular company has a
monopoly, the monopoly is likely to be long lasting as well. A
company in such a position will not only keep market power with its
current standard, but it will have a far easier time obtaining support
from loyal software developers with its future products. Software
engineers will already understand how the company's other products
work, and will be more comfortable with the company's new products
than with ones from a third party.
A current example of leveraging can be seen in the U.S.
Department of Justice v. Microsoft matter, currently in trial. What is
108. See id.
109. See Michael Moeller, Microsoft, DOJ Hit the Courts, PC WEEK ONLINE, (visited Oct.
19, 1998) <http:llwww.zdnet.comlpcweeklstorieslnews/0,4153,361415,00.html>.
110. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co, 351 U.S. 377 (1955).
111. See Lemley, supra note 46, at 1056.
112. See David S. Evans & Bernard Reddy, Some Economic Aspects of Standards in
Network Industries and their Relevance to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 1
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANITRUST, 1996 at 177, 189 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks,
and Literary Property Course Handbook Series, No. G-448, 1996).
113. See Lemley, supra note 46, at 1056.
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at issue is Microsoft's ability to require that its browser be installed
on the desktop of every version of Windows 95. Because Microsoft
has a monopoly in the operating system market, 114 the argument is
that Microsoft is using its monopoly in one market to leverage its
monopoly of the other market. It remains to be seen what control the
government is going to ask for in future releases of Microsoft's
market. Many academics and industry commentators believe the
government has gone far enough. 115
V. THE COUSINS OF ANTITRUST: DEFENSES AvAILABLE TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT
A user of a proprietary standard may have defenses if it uses a
patented software technology although it has no contractual or other
right to otherwise do so. Generally, the patent owner has complete
control over issuing licenses for his patents.116 Only one case has
ever held otherwise: Allied Research Prod, Inc. v. Heatbath Corp, 11 7
where the court held that a patent owner could not discriminatorily
refuse a license to another company solely because of a "personal
dispute" between two individuals. This case has never been followed
by any court.
The generally followed law states instead that patent law
requires no compulsory licensing.11 8  Another leading case is
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Research Medical,
Inc.,119 which held that a patentee's refusal to grant a license to
defendant, after granting a license to defendant's competitor, does not
constitute patent misuse.120
114. It is estimated that Microsoft's operating systems are installed on as many as 95% of
all computers. Will Rodger, Microsoft Hands Over Documents, INTER@CTIVE WEEK (Jan. 29,
1999) available at <http:lwww.zdnet.comlpcweeklstorieslnewslO,4153,1013773,00.html>.
Although there are no set numbers as to what constitutes a monopoly, this would certainly be
considered a monopoly by any court. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
427 (2d Cir. 1945).
115. See Jason Pontin, Out of Step: The Suits Against Microsoft are in Conflict with
Antitrust Policy, RED HERRING, Jul. 1998, at 144.
116. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 19.04[3][f] (1997). See also,
Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co. v. Research Med., Inc., 679 F. Supp. 1037 1065-66(D. Utah
1988); Cygnus Therapeutic Sys. v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.2d 1153, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
117. Allied Research Prods., Inc. v. Heatbath Corp., 300 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
118. Dawson Chem: Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,215 (1980).
119. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Research Med., Inc., 679 F. Supp. 1037 (D. Utah
1988).
120. See CHISUM, supra note 116, at § 19.04[3][f], at n.55.1, citing Data Gen. Corp v.
Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1186 (Ist Cir. 1994); CHISUM, supra note 116, at §
19.04[3][f], at n.54, citing Tricom Inc. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 902 F. Supp. 741, 743
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However, certain conduct by a patentee can prohibit the patentee
from upholding or enforcing his patent rights. Some of these defenses
might be available to someone who is defending against claims of
unauthorized use of a standardized product. In the patent arena,
patent misuse, implied license by equitable estoppel, and equitable
estoppel might be available to a defendant. Copyright has its
counterpart in the copyright misuse defense, which is drawn chiefly
from patent misuse.
A. Patent Misuse
The courts are quite wary of a patentee abusing his patent grant.
As a response to this fear, patent misuse as an equitable defense to an
infringement action, is made available where a patent owner has
exploited his patent in an improper manner either by violating the
antitrust laws or by extending the patent beyond its lawful scope. 121
If misuse is found, the courts will not provide a remedy for
infringement or breach of a license agreement - even if the infringer
is not harmed by the abusive practice. 122
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,123 provides a classic
example of patent misuse. Here, the defendant attempted to force
purchasing of salt with the licensing of its patented salt dispensing
machines. The Court held that Morton's creation of a tying
arrangement was contrary to patent public policy.124
(E.D. Mich. 1995) (holding no compulsory licensing for software).
121. Early lower court decisions refused to recognize as a defense to infringement an
allegation that the plaintiff was engaged in conduct in violation of the antitrust laws. See, e.g.,
Strait v. National Harrow, 51 F. 819, 820 (N.D.N.Y. 1892). However, the Supreme Court
recognized the patent misuse defense in connection with tying cases. See, e.g. Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 664-65 (1943); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas,
448 U.S. 176,200-01 (1980).
122. See CHISUM, supra note 116, at § 19.04, (discussing patent misuse). See also, e.g.,
United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457,465 (1957); Morton Salt Co.
v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-94 (1942); National Patent Dev. Corp. v. T.J. Smith &
Nephew, Ltd., 877 F. 2d 1003, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Riker Lab., Inc. v. Gist Brocades, N.V.,
636 F.2d 772, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding misuse conduct must relate to patent being
litigated, but no harm to patentee is necessary).
123. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
124. See Philip Abromats, Comment: Copyright Misuse and Anticompetitive Softvare
Licensing Restrictions: Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 629, 637
(1991). Morton Salt did not involve the analysis of antitrust laws. For a salt case that did, see
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). International owned patents for
two salt-processing machines, and had the distinction of being the largest producer of salt. The
court ruled that it deserved a limited monopoly of what it invented, but that it could not
monopolize the sales of salt when the effect was to foreclose competitors from the salt market.
See id at 395-96.
426 COMPUTER HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol.15
1. Patent Use Reform Statute
Congress wanted to expressly protect patentees from any
obligation to license their patents. The "Patent Misuse Reform Act"
was passed in 1988,125 and lists acts by patent owners that shall not be
deemed misuse. 35 U.S.C. 271(d) reads:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement shall be... deemed guilty of misuse or
illegal extension of the patent right by reason of having done one
or more of the following:
(4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent...
Although Section 271(d)(4) was said to be an attempt to codify
existing patent law,126 at least one court has stated that a refusal to
license in itself is not a form of patent misuse, but a refusal that
violates the antitrust laws or otherwise seeks to extend the power of
the patent beyond its scope is a form of patent misuse. 127 This law is
quite helpful when the licensing of a patent not commonly used as a
standard is called into question. But, for the standardized software
creator, Section 271(d)(4) helps little when a standard may constitute
an "essential facility,"128 and thus is deemed a natural monopoly,
which triggers liability under antitrust law. 129
The doctrine of patent misuse is a doctrine closely intertwined
with antitrust law.130 The key question in determining if there has
been an antitrust violation is whether the patentee has unlawfully
attempted to misuse or increase its market power in the relevant
markets; any such violation of the antitrust laws will automatically
constitute patent misuse. 131 But even conduct that does not quite
constitute an antitrust violation can still be considered patent
misuse.132
125. Patent Misuse Reform Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994). See also CHISUM, supra note
116, at § 19.04[1](f).
126. See supra Part V.A. See also, Remarks of Representative Kastenmeier, 134 CONG.
REC., H10648, H10648 (Oct. 20, 1988).
127. See Braun v. Abbott, 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also 35 U.S.C. §
271(d)(5) (1994) (tying allowed unless there is market power in the relevant market for the
patent or patented product, the standard for tying under Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984)).
128. See supra Part IV.A.2.b.
129. See infra Part V.A.I.c. for discussion of the interplay between antitrust and patent
misuse laws.
130. See CrlISuJM, supra note 116, at § 19.0412].
131. See id.
132. Chisum states that the "three classic acts of misuse are (1) requiring the purchase of
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2. Braun v. Abbott: The Law of Patent Misuse in the
Federal Circuit
In Braun v. Abbott, the court outlined the patent misuse
defense. 133 The court stated that the patent misuse doctrine is a
method of limiting abuse of patent rights separate from the antitrust
laws. 134 That is, no separate antitrust violation is needed; a lesser test
of liability will suffice. The Federal Circuit held that the key inquiry
in utilizing a patent misuse defense is "whether, by imposing the
condition, the patentee has impermissibly broadened the 'physical or
temporal scope' of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect." 135
This could entail using a patent that enjoys market power in the
relevant market, 136 or restraining competition in an unpatented
product. 137 However, field of use restrictions have generally been
upheld 38 and any anticompetitive effects they may cause are
reviewed in accordance with the rule of reason. 139 Again, this
application of the laws may not help the standard owner in its
prosecution, because of the potential crippling effects on a party
without access to a standardized patent.
Braun was not a Section 271(d)(4) case, rather, it involved post-
sale restrictions on goods. The District Court had allowed an
instruction to the jury stating that a patentee "is not allowed to place
restrictions on customers that prohibit resale of the patented product,
or allow the customer to resell the patented product only in
connection with certain products."'1 40  Braun objected to this
instruction, stating that it created per se liability for any condition that
Braun placed on its sales. 141 The Federal Circuit agreed, affirming its
decision in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.,142 where the court
looked very closely at the legality of restrictions placed upon the post-
sale use of patented goods. Mallinckrodt held that the unconditional
unpatented goods for use with patented apparatus or processes, (2) prohibiting production or
sale of competing goods, and (3) conditioning the granting of a license under one patent upon
the acceptance of another and different license." Id. at § 19.0413].
133. Braun v. Abbott, 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
134. See id.
135. Id. citing Windsurfmg Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir.
1986); see also Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Medipart Inc., 976 F. 2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
136. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1994).
137. Braun, 124 F.3d at 1426.
138. See General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938).
139. See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Medipart Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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sale of a patented device will generally exhaust the patentee's right to
control the purchaser's use of the device. 143 This is known as the
exhaustion doctrine.
Most importantly for software producers, however, is that the
exhaustion doctrine does not apply to an expressly conditional sale or
license144 - in software law, this is an EULA.145 The Braun court
explained that it is more reasonable to infer that the parties negotiated
a price that reflects only the value of the "use" rights conferred by the
patentee. 146 As a result, express conditions accompanying the sale or
license of a patented product are generally upheld.147 A strict reading
of this would imply that if the owner of a patent, used as a standard in
an industry, refused to license a technology, then it would be upheld
by the terms of the EULA and the end-user would have no recourse.
However, the court noted that such express conditions are contractual
in nature and are subject to antitrust, patent, contract, and any other
applicable law, as well as equitable considerations such as patent
misuse. Conditions that violate another law or equitable
consideration are unenforceable, but violation of valid conditions
entitles the patentee to a remedy for patent infringement or breach of
contract. 148
3. Interplay Between Antitrust and Patent Misuse
But what if the patentee's refusal to license deprives a
competitor of something it needs to compete in the relevant market?
This action appears to be an antitrust violation despite Congress'
mandate that refusal to license is not patent misuse, thereby creating
the complex relationship between the misuse doctrine and the federal
antitrust laws. 149 As the court outlined in Braun, use of a patent to
violate the antitrust laws will constitute misuse. 150 However, conduct
that falls short of an antitrust violation may still constitute misuse.151
143. See id., at 706; Braun, 124 F.3d at 1426.
144. See Braun, 124 F.3d at 1426.
145. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
146. But see infra notes 160-162 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wang
Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electronics, 103 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997), where the court
found that Wang did get their asking price: standardization of their product.
147. See Braun, 124 F.3d at 1426; Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708; cf. General Talking
Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938) (holding that under the facts of
the case, a restrictive license is legal).
148. See Braun, 124 F.3d, at 1426; Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 703.
149. See CHISUM, supra note 116, at § 19.0412].
150. See Braun, 124 F.3d at 1426.
151. See id.
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This would seem to indicate that antitrust has a higher standard.
In the antitrust laws, unilateral refusals to deal are illegal when
they constitute monopolization or an attempt to monopolize the
market. 152 The plaintiff must show that the defendant is a monopolist
and that the refusal to deal is an anti-competitive exclusionary
practice, 153 since a monopolist may refuse to deal provided the refusal
is not anti-competitive. 154 If this is the antitrust standard, 155 then
antitrust may provide grounds for a plaintiff to assert rights to a
development technology. This would circumvent the patent misuse
statute's directive and create a loophole for liability. If it is assumed
that the product in question is a standard for the type of application
that the plaintiff wants to create, unavailability of the standard will
have devastating anti-competitive effects. 156
A patent owner regains the right to enforce a patent when
improper patent misuse practice has been fully abandoned, and the
consequences of the act have fully been dissipated.157 As such, no
award of damages is available to the accused infringer - only the
right to use the patent. But if misuse were found to be that of
leveraging or monopoly conduct, when would the company be able to
re-assert its patent rights? When the standards have changed? One
wonders what would happen to the user's existing products that have
incorporated the standardized technologies?
152. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 149-50 (1951). Defendant
newspaper's intent in refusing to deal with those who had bought advertising on the radio was
found to reserve an advertising monopoly to itself. See also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands, 472 U.S. 585, 604-04 (1985), where the Supreme Court reaffirmed Lorain Journal,
and held that a refusal to deal by a monopolist, together with a showing of anticompetitive
motive or intent violated section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
153. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands, 472 U.S. 585, 596, 604 (finding jury
instructions proper).
154. Such unilateral refusals to deal are illegal under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1994) and under the "unfair competition" provision of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1994).
155. See Braun, 124 F.3d at 1426.
156. An example of this might be found in a dispute over the GIF graphic file exchange
format. Invented by Compuserve in 1987, Compuserve released the standard for everyone to
develop and incorporate in their products. A patent had been obtained in 1986 for the
compression algorithm used in the standard, and the owner of the patent, Unisys, failed to
inform anyone of its existence. The file format gained a huge acceptance and a large market
share, and was wide spread in graphics programs. In 1994 Unisys began to assert its patent
rights, after having remained completely silent while the standard ensued. The case has never
been litigated. See Jimmy Guterman, Are your GIFs legal? CHICAGO TRImUNE, June 18, 1998
at 1.
157. See CHISUM, supra note 116, at § 19.04[3] (1997); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger
Co., 314 U.S. 488,492-93 (1942); B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495-98 (1942).
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B. Implied License as Defense
Another theory available to one refused a patent license for a
development tool is that of implied license, also known as implied
license by equitable estoppel. 158 The doctrine of implied license by
equitable estoppel is related to that of equitable estoppel, discussed
infra in Part V.C. The primary difference is that in implied license
cases courts look for an affirmative grant of consent or permission to
make, use, or sell the embodiment of a patented technology, while
equitable estoppel cases focus on examining "misleading" conduct
that suggested the patentee would not enforce patent rights. 159
Judicially implied licenses are rare under any doctrine, but courts will
grant them if a specific, course of conduct is exhibited by the
patentee.160
In Wang v. Mitsubishi, the Federal Circuit upheld a finding of
noninfringement by implied license based on the lower court's
examination of equitable estoppel principles. Wang set out to make
its memory module the standard in the industry, and successfully
convinced the relevant national standards committee to adopt the
technology. Rather than produce the chips themselves, Wang
encouraged manufacturers to begin producing and marketing the
modules. Several manufacturers, including Mitsubishi, cooperated
with Wang to begin producing and marketing the modules.
Meanwhile, without disclosing to anyone it was pursuing a patent
application, Wang applied for and was awarded several patents on the
module design. When Wang sued Mitsubishi for infringement of the
patent, Mitsubishi raised the defense of implied license, and the court
allowed the defense. 161
The court held that an implied license merely signifies a
patentee's waiver of the statutory right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the patented invention. 162 It explained that
158. This is not the same defense as equitable estoppel, discussed infra Section V.C.
159. See Wang Lab. Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs., 103 F.3d 1571, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
160. See id. at 1580.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 1579, citing Spindefabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v.
Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik Akiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
See also DeForest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241 (1927), where the
Supreme Court stated:
No formal granting of a license is necessary in order to give it effect. Any
language used by the owner of the patent, or any conduct on his part exhibited to
another from which that other may properly infer that the owner consents to his
use of the patent in making or using it, or selling it, upon which the other acts,
constitutes a license and a defense to an action for a tort.
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an implied license could not arise out of the unilateral expectations or
even reasonable hopes of one party; one must have been led to take
action by the conduct of the other party. 163 "Accused infringer's acts
of going forward to the point where it became committed to utilizing
an inventor's patented inventions in its new lines cannot in itself
create [an implied license of equitable] estoppel."164 Implied licenses
arise by acquiescence, by conduct, by equitable estoppel (estoppel in
pals), or by legal estoppel.165 Therefore, the courts will look at the
entire course of conduct for facts giving rise to estoppel, and at how
the conduct of the patentee caused the other to act,166 in order to
conclude whether or not an implied license exists. 167
However, neither the Federal Circuit nor the Supreme Court
requires a formal finding of equitable estoppel for a legal conclusion
of implied license. 168 The primary difference is that implied license
cases look for an affirmative grant of consent or permission to make,
use, or sell the patented technology, 169 where equitable estoppel cases
focus on "misleading" conduct suggesting that the patentee will not
enforce patent rights. 170
In Wang, the court took particular note that 1) the parties had
been in meetings for over six years; 2) Wang coaxed Mitsubishi into
the SIMM market; 3) Wang provided designs, suggestions, and
samples to Mitsubishi; and 4) Wang purchased the resulting SIMMs
from Mitsubishi, years before accusing Mitsubishi of infringement. 171
But Wang has facts on the extreme side of the scenario: long duration,
and intimacy of the parties. While these circumstances may be of
help to parties who are familiar with each other, it is probably
doubtful that an implied license could ever be found among
See also, RSA Data Sec., Inc. v. Cylink Corp., No. 96-20094 SW, 1996 WL 266201, (N.D. Cal
May 17, 1996).
163. See Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The court
affirmed that no implied license exists unless there is a nexus between the patentee's conduct
and the infringing actions.
164. Id
165. See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs., 103 F.3d 1571, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1997); AMP,
Inc. v. United States, 389 F.2d 448, 452 nn. 4-5.
166. See Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 925-6 (Fed. Cir.
1984); Stickle, 716 F.2d at 1559.
167. See Wang, 103 F.3d, at 1579; AMP, 389 F.2d at 452.
168. See AMP, 389 F.2d at 453-54. An effect otherwise would remove all distinction
between the doctrines.
169. See Wang, 103 F.3d at 1580; Stickle, 716 F.2d at 1559.
170. See Wang, 103 F.3d at 1580; A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960
F.2d 1020, 1041-44 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
171. See Wang 103 F.3d at 1582.
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anonymous end users of a standard product.
Perhaps the most interesting and relevant part of Wang for
development tool creators was the court's finding that Wang received
the compensation it desired for "licensing" its technology. Wang's
patents became industry standard, and remain the standard today.172
Although no financial remuneration changed hands, Wang got what it
wanted with the help of others. The court held that having a standard
product is good enough for Wang.173 This may be what most
standardized software developers want. 174 The granting of a standard
may take away the patentee's right to enforce the patent on the
particular standard, but it does give the patentee name recognition, a
broad user base, and general industry acceptance of the company's
technologies.
C. Equitable Estoppel
Another defense available in patent infringement is equitable
estoppel. If a software company places its patented technology into
the marketplace for all to use, actively promotes it to be used as the
standard in the industry, and assures software and hardware
developers that they can use it freely, a user of patented technology
may assert the defense of equitable estoppel. Elements of an
equitable estoppel defense are:
(1) the patentee, through misleading conduct, leads the alleged
infringer to reasonably infer that he does not intend to enforce the
patent against the alleged infringer. The conduct may include specific
statements, action, inaction, or silence where there is a duty to speak;
(2) the alleged infringer relies on the patentee's conduct; and
(3) due to the reliance, the alleged infringer will be materially
prejudiced if the patentee is permitted to proceed with its
infringement suit.175
The Federal Circuit describes a typical equitable estoppel
situation as follows: (1) the infringer knows of the patent; (2) the
patentee objects to the infringer's activities; (3) the patentee does not
seek relief until much later; and (4) the infringer is misled to believe
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See supra Part 11.
175. ABB Robotics, Inc. v. Robotics Corp., 52 F.3d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1995); accord, AC.
Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc); B. Braun
Med. Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419, 1425 (1997).
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the patentee will not act on its patents. 176
Braun v. Abbott177 discusses both equitable estoppel and patent
misuse. 178 Braun invented and manufactured a valve and licensed the
patent to Abbott, with the restriction that it not be used in "extension
sets" that permit the delivery of additional fluids and drugs.179
Abbott instead asked NP Medical, its co-defendant, to manufacture
similar valves for it.180 In finding an equitable estoppel defense
inapplicable, the court stated the standard equitable estoppel
defimition, 181 and held that there was no equitable estoppel defense
available to Abbott because
Where exists no evidence that Braun communicated anything to
Abbott or NP Medical that would lead them to believe that Braun
would not sue them for infringement if they made, used, or sold
competing valves.., although Braun did have relations with
Abbott, those relations concerned [other matters]. 182
With standard development technologies, the availability of the
equitable estoppel defense would be a very fact intensive inquiry. A
court would have to consider whether the standard creator attempted
to assert its patents and then ceased doing so, whether the parties were
at arms length, and what the expectations of the parties were in
granting and using the development tool technology. This is probably
the most difficult argument for an anonymous party who downloads
software from the Internet to make. Although the company must
know that its technology is being mass deployed and mass used, the
company often is not on specific notice of who exactly is using it and
for what purpose.
D. The Child of Patent Misuse: Copyright Misuse
Much of software is protected under copyright laws because
until recently, it was not patentable. Additionally, some software
developers chose not to patent their technologies due to the time and
expense involved. 183 As previously stated, copyright laws confer a
176. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F. 2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en
banc); Wang, 103 F.3d at 1579.
177. Braun v. Abbott, 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
178. See supra Part V.A.3.
179. See Braun, 124 F.3d at 1422.
180. See id.
181. See id. See also supra note 176 and accompanying text.
182. Braun, 124 F.3d at 1425.
183. See supra Part III.B.
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limited monopoly on the copyright holder.184 Monopolies can be
abused in an attempt to restrain competition in a situation analogous
to antitrust law restrictions. Copyright misuse can be offered as a
defense to prevent recovery when the plaintiff has engaged in
misconduct analogous to that found in patent misuse, or
anticompetitive behavior.
The misuse doctrine exists primarily in patent law, 185 but was
adopted most notably as a viable defense to copyright infringement in
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds.186 The Fourth Circuit held that
"a misuse of copyright defense is inherent in the law of copyright just
as a misuse of patent defense is inherent in patent law." 187 But
Lasercomb is tenuous: prior to 1990,188 there had been only one case
that applied the doctrine to bar recovery on a copyright infringement
claim.189 Indeed, commentators have suggested that this is a bizarre
holding and is not in accordance with standing law.190
But a copyright misuse defense might be attractive to litigants:
the copyright misuse defense is a per se violation, since it avoids the
uncertainties and difficulties involved in proving that a restraint of
trade is unreasonable under the antitrust laws. 191 And, like patent
misuse, an antitrust violation may not be necessary for the defense to
be upheld.192
Lasercomb1 93 is the exceptional case. Other courts have
completely denied the existence of the copyright misuse defense on
similar facts. 194 From the rulings, one might think that the Fourth
184. See supra Part ll.B.
185. See supra Part V.A.1.
186. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990).
187. Id. at 973. -
188. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990) was decided in 1990.
189. See Abromats, supra note 124, at 634. In a case involving ASCAP, M. Witmark &
Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp 843 (D. Minn. 1948), aff'd sub nom. M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger
Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949), ,ASCAP licensees were forced to purchase a
blanket license for every song that ASCAP owned. The court held that ASCAP was using the
copyright laws impermissibly and had exceeded the constitutionally granted monopoly, under
public policy grounds.
190. See generally Abromats, supra note 124.
191. See Marshall Leaffer, Engineering Competitive Policy and Copyright Misuse, 19
DAYTON LAW REV. 1087, 1088-89 (1994). Antitrust regulates nearly every industry.
192. See Research, Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l Inc., 793 F. Supp. 68, 69 (E.D.N.Y.
1992).
193. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v; Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970,976 (4th Cir. 1990).
194. Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g. Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g., Inc., 933 F.2d 952, 951
(11th Cir. 1991), rev'd en banc, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993); Practice Management Info.
Corp. v. American Med. Ass'n, 877 F. Supp. 1386, 1393-94 (C.D. Cal. 1994); Microsoft Corp.
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Circuit stands alone with Lasercomb. However, the Fifth Circuit
recently upheld an injunction based on anticipated success of a misuse
defense in a software dispute. 195
But the concerns for the software technology creator are the
same; any further extension of the doctrine can give rise to similar
fears as with patent misuse and antitrust concerns. 196 A lesser
standard than that for antitrust liability is acceptable to find the
defense; any refusal to license can implicate anti-competitive effects
that antitrust so desperately seeks to prohibit.
VI. COMPETING POLICY CONCERNS AND THE CONSTITUTIONALLY GRANTED
MONOPOLIES
A. Juxtapositions of Contradictions
There is a terrible contradiction of policies at work here. The
software development community demands, needs, and requests
decent standards. But spending the time, money, and extensive
resources to create and develop a standard creates a relationship of
love and hate. Developers are absolutely dependent on the
company's standard proprietary creations: they wait anxiously for the
next bug-fixed release to come out, for improvements in the tools or
the language, and for the standard to evolve in ways that they see fit.
Companies usually do what is best for business, which usually does
not involve giving charitable donations of their inventions to the
software community.
The relationship between a company and the software developers
who incorporate its technology has its juxtaposition in the law as well.
Our antitrust laws were designed to foster competition, and the
Constitution gives inventors and creators protection for their works.
But in antitrust, copyright, and patent law, there are major offensive
and defensive tactics that an opponent or intellectual property
infringer could take against the standard development tool creator to
try to strip it of full rights to its works. What may appear as anti-
competitive behavior by the software developer may just be the result
of the natural forces working in the market place, especially in an
industry such as software.
The tension has to break. A decision to apply antitrust and the
v. BEC Computer Co., 818 F. Supp. 1313, 1316-17 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
195. DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs, Inc., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996).
196. See supra Part V.A.1.
436 COMPUTER HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol.15
intellectual property defenses related to antitrust doctrines could
dramatically extend the scope of antitrust intervention in the
market.197  Many commentators have argued that sua generis
legislation is needed198 for a field that is grasping for anything it can
take from normal common law principles.
Others argue that if a company is to create a standard, it must
donate it to the world and allow the standard to be intellectual-
property free. 199 And still others propose (and in the case of some
standards setting organizations, actually require) that there be a
mandatory reasonable license fee for a standard to find harmony with
the law.200
As it stands now, any extension of the law that finds a
requirement to license or donate to the public could go directly
against the Constitution, which granted authors and inventors the
protection of their property in the first place.201 That is, courts refuse
to create a practice of forced licensing.202
B. A Balance Must Be Struck
A medium should be struck. With such a legal arsenal in the
technology user's position, it is likely that a standard owner would be
forced to give up her intellectual property rights. A company that
invested so much to create, could have its rights stripped away from
it, and face years of legal fees.
One possible solution is this. Sua generis legislation should be
enacted to exempt standard creators from liability for antitrust
offenses. Furthermore, the patent misuse act should likewise be
modified to disallow the use of such defense when it implicates
standardized technologies because of the inappropriateness of the
application of 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)(4) to standards. 203 This would
allow the standard creator to keep his constitutionally protected rights
197. See Lemley, supra note 46, at 1085. Perhaps the scope has already been extended
with the Department of Justice's prosecution of Microsoft and Intel. See Michael Moeller,
Microsoft, DOJ Hit the Courts (Oct. 19, 1999) <http:lwww.zdnet.comlpcweeklstories/news/
0,4153,361415,00.html>.
198. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning The Legal Protection Of
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308,2312 (1994).
199. See Lemley, supra note 46, at 1090.
200. See id. (discussing the practices of ANSI).
201. See U.S. CoNST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
202. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
203. See supra notes 124-131 and accompanying text.
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and be compensated for them.
The creator should be required to license the standards to parties
to whom it would otherwise refuse, but not under principles of
existing law where no compensation would be given (e.g., if a misuse
defense is successful the patentee cannot assert his patent rights at
all). The compulsory licensing requirements should require: 1) the
developer of the technology actively to encourage the use of its
product as a standard; 2) an independent body of industry persons to
determine the appropriate royalty or licensing fee for the licensing of
the standard; and 3) such licensing to occur under the same terms that
other parties receive - i.e., what is fair in the marketplace.
This would also leave the standard creation companies with
adequate recourse. Suits might be permitted if the licensee breached
the contract terms. The parties would also be able to set prices and
negotiate separately in their customary licensing practices. A
governing body separate from the courts would only step in when a
dispute arose between a development tool creator and a proposed
licensee. And again, this solution would only occur if the party
actively took steps to make its product a standard.
This solution, although taking some rights away from all parties
involved, would resolve the tension that currently exists in the
software development tool industry. Such a solution would cut short
many years of litigation and disputes over standardized technologies
in a field where rapid evolutionary changes are the norm. It would
also protect the standard developer companies from current legal
principles that attempt to take away their constitutionally granted
rights. In addition, it would provide the companies needing standards
with the resources they need at a reasonable fee.204  Holding
companies liable for antitrust liability and providing proposed
licensees with a variety of defenses would hold these providers
subject to liability and would contravene the Constitution, which
gives them full rights to ownership of their intellectual property.
VII. CONCLUSION
Companies currently have much to gain if they develop standard
software development tool technology. At the same time, these
entities have much to give to the software industry that desperately
needs these standards. But with the privilege of owning a standard
comes a plethora of legal issues about which to be concerned. With a
204. See supra Part IV.A.l.b for a discussion of the essential facility doctrine.
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technology's acceptance comes the dependence of software
developers on the resulting standard. Without access to the standard,
product development efforts by software developers could be
crippled.
This Comment proposes that Congress should enact legislation
to create a safe harbor for standard creating entities. Such legislation
would allow -these entities to own their software along with a
respective bundle of rights, and would create separate rules to protect
their software. At the same time, this leglislation would protect users
of the standards through mandatory licensing of the development tool
technology at rates and on terms determined by the contracting parties
and an independent tribunal. Without such proposed legislation,
prosecution of standard creation entities could be wrongly prosecuted
through the misapplication of modem legal principles, and the
restriction of inventive and expressive rights will occur.
